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Abstract 
Elections and electoral assistance have come close to meeting the criteria for a “global 
public goods challenge,” the consequences of which affect both the developed and 
developing worlds. This paper argues that by seeing elections not as the end result but 
rather a periodical reevaluation of effectiveness, NGOs can better develop programs that 
measure long-term effectiveness. Based on both the literature and examples of a handful 
of NGOs, this essay describes the nature and scope of the problem with elections and 
election assistance. It then looks at the ways in which transnational civil society could 
contribute to addressing and solving this challenge. It concluded that transnational non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) could have a greater impact on this global public 
goods challenge by: educating stakeholders on the relationship between elections and 
democracy; linking electoral assistance to election observation; taking sides to uphold 
international electoral standards yet steering clear of partisanship; engaging national 
and local civil societies in long-term campaign and coverage monitoring; empowering 
local poll-watchers; and, using their leverage to take action against election fraud and 
candidate prosecution.
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Introduction 
In the Philippines, despite competitive elections 
over the past decade and a half, several features of 
the political system tarnish the quality of freedom, 
including rising concerns about the integrity of 
electoral institutions, civilian killings, and military 
unrest. (Walker & Kelly, 2007, p. 7)
In Colombia, President Alvaro Uribe’s 2006 
reelection victory, which followed a constitutional 
change in 2005 allowing him to run for a second term, 
was approved by international observers as free and 
fair. However, later in 2006 information emerged 
that seemed to provide proof of long-rumored links 
between paramilitaries and government officials. 
(Walker & Kelly, 2007, p. 8) 
The model of pursuing economic growth while 
eroding the independence of critical institutions has 
been adopted by three oil-rich states in the former 
Soviet Union: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia. 
(Walker & Goehring, 2008, p. 32)
Philippines, Colombia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
and Russia are hardly exceptions: According to the 2009 
Freedom in the World Survey (Freedom House, 2009), an 
alarming number of nations that otherwise meet the criteria 
of electoral democracies has been strengthening state control 
over their civil societies, media, and judiciary (Puddington, 
2009).  Political and civil unrests followed “free and fair” 
elections in Kenya in December 2007, in Bangladesh in 
December 2008, and in Moldova in April 2009, to name a 
few.  As a consequence, citizens of those nations grow more 
distrustful not only of state officials and institutions but also 
of the power of elections and the benefits of democracy in 
general.  
Within two decades having turned from a stepping stone 
toward national development into a questionable indicator 
of democratization, the democratic electoral systems and 
processes have become a focus of controversy among 
members of the international development community.  This 
paper seeks to demonstrate that the controversy around 
elections has come close to meeting the criteria for an actual 
challenge of global public goods—similar to such challenges 
as ethnic and territorial conflicts or human trafficking.  While 
the costs of the challenge with elections are seemingly 
immaterial—especially in comparison with the price tag 
of conflict resolution or human trafficking prevention—its 
explicit and implicit consequences affect both developing 
and developed societies around the world.  
Based on the literature and examples of a handful 
of NGOs, this paper describes the nature and scope of the 
problem with elections and election assistance.  It then 
looks at the ways in which transnational civil society could 
contribute to addressing and solving this challenge. 
What Makes Elections a Global Public Goods Challenge?
Elections in the Context of Democracy, Governance 
and Human Rights
Elections assistance is a relatively recent area of international 
development. It emerged in the 1980s as one of the three 
core components—in addition to civil society and rule-
of-law—within the broader developmental field that is 
usually referred to as democracy promotion or democracy 
building (Bjornlund, 2004; Carothers, 2002, 2004; Chand, 
1997; Elklit & Svensson, 1997; Hart, 2007).  As a result of 
the fall of several Southern European and Latin American 
military dictatorships in the mid 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. 
and British foreign policy communities saw a growing need 
for assistance with establishing democratic systems and 
processes in those post-authoritarian nations.  Following the 
collapse of most Eastern European and Soviet communist 
regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the entire donor 
community embraced democracy promotion as a separate 
field of international development.  
Since the early 1990s, it has become customary—in 
particular, among the Western governments—to view the 
post-authoritarian nations as being in transition toward 
democracy (Carothers, 2002, 2006, 2009).  Correspondingly, 
in the mid 1990s, the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)—both previously reluctant to 
impose non-economic conditions—introduced political and 
institutional prerequisites such as having a democratically 
elected government in place for a nation to receive aid 
(Chhotray & Hulme, 2007).  To reflect these trends, a 
more comprehensive label has recently been adopted to 
describe international, multilateral and bilateral programs 
that deal with political parties, civil societies, elections, and 
governments—i.e., democracy and governance (e.g., United 
Nations Development Program/UNDP, 2009; European 
Commission, 2008; United States Agency for International 
Development/USAID, 2009).  
Within this broader context of democracy and 
governance, elections assistance is featured rather 
prominently due to the role that electoral systems and 
processes play in determining whether and to what extent 
a society is democratic.  For instance, the UNDP sees the 
development of electoral systems and processes as a way 
to uphold the cornerstone of democracy (UNDP, 2009). 
The European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR) asserts that poverty, conflict and terrorism 
cannot be eliminated without enhancing the reliability and 
transparency of democratic electoral processes (European 
Commission, 2009).  USAID regards free and fair elections 
indispensable to democracy (USAID, 2009).  
Normative and Practical Outcomes of Elections
In an attempt to explain why elections are important for 
democracy, scholars look at the concept of elections from 
both normative and practical perspectives.  
Normatively, free and fair elections are: (1) a principle 
of democracy—i.e., there is no democracy without free 
and fair elections (Carothers, 2002; Elklit & Svensson, 
1997; van Beuningen, 2007); and (2) a factor conducive 
to democracy—i.e., elections have a democratizing effect 
(Howard & Roessler, 2006; Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002; 
Teorell & Hadenius, 2008).  On the other hand, elections 
are not sufficient for democracy to exist (Carothers, 2002; 
Elklit & Svensson, 1997; Harcourt, 2007; van Beuningen, 
2007).  Moreover, elections do not miraculously democratize 
societies (Teorell & Hadenius, 2008).
From the developmental practice’s perspective, free 
and fair elections are: (1) a goal of democratic transition 
(Hart, 2006); (2) a catalysts to greater democracy (Bjornlund, 
2004); (3) a measure of democratization in transitional 
nations (Elklit & Svensson, 1997; Machangana, 2007; van 
Beuningen, 2007); (4) an opportunity to broaden citizen 
participation in public life (Bjornlund, 2004); (5) a peace-
building factor (Chand, 1997; Hart, 2006; Schwedler, 2007; 
Van Beuningen, 2007); and (6) a condition for getting 
additional developmental assistance—not only in the areas 
of democracy and governance aid, but also in the areas of 
economic and social life (Carothers, 2002, 2006). 
In other words, while scholarly literature tends to be 
cautiously optimistic vis-à-vis the normative implications of 
elections for democracy, it recognizes the role of elections 
for the international development industry as a whole. 
Nevertheless, the current state of affairs in the areas of 
democracy and governance in general—and in the elections 
assistance in particular—is increasingly characterized as 
going through a crisis (Carothers, 2002, 2006; Schedler, 
2002).           
Crisis in the Areas of Democracy Promotion and 
Election Assistance
Indeed, the democratization enthusiasm of the late 1990s 
has faded away.  Less than ten years into the new century, 
both the international donor community and the nations 
in transition are having reservations about democracy and 
democracy promotion.  Specifically, the worth of electoral 
programs is questioned (Carothers, 2002, 2006; Schedler, 
2002).  Van Beuningen (2007) observed: 
Free elections are essential but not sufficient for 
the makeup and well-functioning of democracy. 
In order to avoid perversion, respect for human 
rights… and for the rule of law is indispensable, as 
are effective institutions and checks and balances. 
(p. 52)
The Secretary General of the International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International 
IDEA), a Stockholm, Sweden-based intergovernmental 
organization, summarized, “Globally we see democracy 
today being challenged in various ways, and in new ways” 
(Helgesen, 2008).  Among those new challenges Helgesen 
(2008) mentioned: (1) doubts that democracy is good for 
development; (2) perceptions that democracy promotion is 
a cover-up for regime change; (3) doubts that democracy 
is good for conflict resolution; and (4) distrust of political 
parties and parliaments.    
In a number of countries not long ago considered to 
be in transition toward democracy (e.g., Bolivia, Malawi), 
undemocratic regimes have seized power through democratic 
elections (Carothers, 2006, 2009; Puddington, 2009; Walker 
& Goehring; 2008; Walker & Kelly, 2007).  In addition, 
some of those regimes (e.g., Russia) have profited from high 
oil and gas prices to consolidate their influence both at home 
and abroad (Carothers, 2006; Walker & Goehring, 2008). 
Although election fraud and intimidation of opposition are 
common, most international observers conclude that by 
and large the elections that take place in those countries 
are free and fair (Golder, 2005; Howard & Roessler, 2006; 
Puddington, 2009). 
Also, in many nations the transition toward democracy 
and free market has not produced the expected economic 
improvements (e.g., Ukraine), whereas some non-democratic 
states (e.g., China) have been able to achieve great economic 
successes (Puddington, 2009).  Moreover, internal and 
international conflicts have erupted in a number of newly 
established democracies (e.g., Serbia and Kosovo).   
Furthermore, some of the major democracy promotion 
donor countries (e.g., USA and UK) have embraced 
interventionist foreign policies in Iraq and elsewhere. 
Therefore, their support of democracy promotion 
programs have been increasingly perceived as hypocritical: 
“Washington’s use of the term ‘democracy promotion’ has 
come to be seen overseas not as the expression of a principled 
American aspiration but as a code word for ‘regime change’” 
(Carothers, 2006, p. 6). 
Additionally, some donor organizations have tended to 
overrate the importance of elections in promoting democracy. 
Carothers (2002) summarized the problem with electoral 
assistance:
Democracy promoters have not been guilty—as 
critics often charge—of believing that elections 
equal democracy… Nevertheless, they have 
tended to hold very high expectations for what the 
establishment of regular, genuine elections will do 
for democratization. (p. 7)
Electoral Assistance’s Landscape
Major Actors
Several levels of actors provide electoral assistance: from 
bilateral developmental organizations (e.g., USAID, 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit/
GTZ, UK Department for International Development/
DIFD) to bilateral political organizations (e.g., National 
Endowment for Democracy/NED, the German Stiftungen, 
the Westminster Foundation), and from regional 
intergovernmental organizations (e.g., Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe/OSCE, the Organization 
of American States, the Organization of African Unity) 
to international multilateral organizations (e.g., UNDP, 
International IDEA).  In addition, a number of foundations 
and NGOs list electoral assistance among the development 
services they provide worldwide (e.g., the Carter Center, the 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems/IFES) or 
in specific regions (e.g., the Asia Foundation, the African-
American Institute).1  
Among the latter category of actors—i.e., nonprofit 
nongovernmental organizations—U.S.-based groups seem 
to predominate (Bjornlund, 2004; Carothers, 2004). A 
handful of those NGOs make the headlines of international 
news media more often than not: IFES, the International 
Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute 
(NDI), the Asia Foundation, and the Carter Center.  
NGOs that make up this “vanguard group” (Bjornlund, 
2004) receive funds from a variety of donors, including 
U.S. and non-U.S. bilateral organizations (e.g., USAID, 
NED, DFID, AusAID, Canadian International Development 
Agency/CIDA), Japan International Cooperation Agency/
JICA), as well as multilateral organizations (e.g., European 
Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe/OSCE, UNDP, the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank/ADB) and private sources (e.g., Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation, Open Society Institute).2 
Frequently, these NGOs enter into alliances among 
themselves (e.g., IFES, IRI and NDI in the Consortium of 
Electoral and Political Processes Strengthening/CEPPS) 
or with other organizations (e.g., IFES with UNDP, 
International IDEA and others in the Electoral Knowledge 
Network/ACE3) in order to implement electoral assistance 
programs. 
Electoral Assistance’s Phases and Activities
Typically, support to the election systems and processes 
in a country involve the efforts of a few or several donor 
organizations--depending on the country size and its political 
situation.  Generally, at least two development agencies 
(e.g., a bilateral such as USAID, and an international such as 
UNDP) focus on a comprehensive, long-term assistance that 
includes three major phases: (1) pre-election; (2) the election 
day; and (3) post-election (Bjornlund, 2004; Carothers, 
2004; Hart, 2006).  Several other donor organizations come 
into play around the election day only, by funding short-term 
election observation missions (Bjornlund, 2004; Chand, 
1997).
The objectives of the long-term assistance differ from 
those of the election observation missions.  The long-term 
assistance seeks to (1) strengthen the political prerequisites 
for elections; (2) solidify an independent media; (3) 
establish and develop a legal and institutional electoral 
infrastructure that assures free and fair access to all eligible 
voters; (4) monitor the elections to decrease the probability 
of widespread fraud; and (5) strengthen the democratization 
process and promote the reconciliation between the parties 
(Hart, 2006).  
The objectives of the short-term observation are limited 
to visiting polling stations and reporting on the observed 
irregularities during balloting and counting (Chand, 1997). 
Occasionally, the terms monitoring and observation are 
used interchangeably.  However, the monitoring process 
is somewhat more engaged and long-term whereas the 
observation process is rather passive and short-term 
(Bjornlund, 2004).  Monitoring begins a year before and 
ends months after the election and involves quite a few actors 
(e.g., political parties, media, governments, etc.), whereas 
the election-day observation usually focuses on voters and 
polling station workers only.  
Pre-Election Activities
During the pre-election phase, the implementing NGOs 
or coalitions of NGOs assist with (a) the development/
amendment of the electoral law; (b) institutional-building 
activities for/with the national election commission; 
(c) monitoring of the candidate registration and other 
administrative processes; (d) surveying the political climate, 
candidates’ campaigns, and media coverage; (e) mobilizing/
training local poll watchers; and (f) facilitating public 
education and get-out-the-vote campaigns.
Typically, two or three different implementers would 
be responsible each for one type of pre-election activities 
(e.g., legislative, administrative and political).  For instance, 
the CEPPS NGOs would divide the responsibilities among 
them with IFES taking the lead in the administrative process, 
and NDI and IRI handling the legislative and political 
processes.  
Transnational NGO Example: According to its website, 
IFES (2009a) seeks to bring transparency to elections by 
involving local civil societies in the process (e.g., providing 
observer training, facilitating negotiations with national 
election commissions, etc.) and by incorporating anti-fraud 
mechanisms (e.g., developing political finance instruments, 
providing transparent ballot boxes, etc.).  In September 2003, 
IFES (2009b) launched the EVER project, which helps civil 
society organizations (CSOs) in a given country develop a 
toolkit to effectively monitor and prevent election violence 
in conjunction with election management bodies and security 
forces.  The EVER project also tracks incidents of electoral 
violence in a global journal to which CSOs contribute source 
material (IFES, 2009b).  
Election Day Activities
Right before the election, several teams of international 
observers arrive.  It is not unusual to have dignitaries among 
international observers (e.g., parliamentarians, government 
officials, etc.).  As mentioned earlier, their responsibilities are 
limited to visiting poll stations on the election day, observing/
monitoring the process, and issuing initial assessments and 
final reports (Carothers, 2004; Chand, 1997).  
Referring to the expansion of election observation 
activities in the 1980s and 1990s, Chand (1997) described five 
observer functions: (1) the presence of observers improves 
the credibility of the election process by deterring fraud; (2) 
observers provide technical assistance to improve electoral 
process; (3) observers can mediate disputes; (4) observers 
help open up the electoral process by bringing problems into 
the open and pressuring for their ratification; and (5) outside 
organization involved in monitoring are usually part of a 
wider peace-building strategy (pp. 546-547).   
The NGOs implementing the pre-election assistance 
occasionally bring in their own international observation 
teams but, by and large, they provide support to local teams 
of poll watchers (Bjornlund, 2004; Carothers, 2004).  With 
reference to how transnational NGOs utilize their elections 
assistance resources, Chand (1997) observed, “The crucial 
role of NGOs in international election monitoring has 
contributed to greater pluralism in global civil society, and 
produced a web of largely cooperative ties based on niche 
specialization between IGOs and NGOs” (p. 559). 
Transnational NGO Examples: According to its 
website, the Asia Foundation (2009) views elections as 
opportunities through which broader democratization 
objectives, including strengthening of civil society, can be 
advanced.  Therefore, the organization focuses on training 
domestic monitors and facilitating regional observers rather 
than bringing international teams.
The Carter Center (2009a) doesn’t send its 
representatives unless invited by a country’s election 
authorities and welcomed by the major political parties to 
ensure it can play a meaningful, nonpartisan role.  Long 
before election day, observers are expected to analyze election 
laws, assess voter education and registration, and evaluate 
fairness in campaigns.  The Carter Center also believes that 
the presence of impartial observers when votes are cast can 
deter fraud.  Before, during, and after an election, the Center’s 
findings are reported to the international community through 
public statements. 
Post-election Activities
During the final, post-election stage, development NGOs 
assist the election commissions and civil society organizations 
with the processes of vote tabulation, claim adjudication, 
and results assessment.  
Transnational NGO Example: Following the 
contentious presidential elections in December 2007, IFES 
(2009c) continued its work with the Election Commission of 
Kenya (ECK) under a grant provided by the Open Society 
Institute’s East Africa Initiative.  A number of specific 
recommendations for the ECK itself, as well as the country’s 
legislature, were issued by the NGO and subsequently 
adopted by the Kenyan government.
Achievements and Setbacks of Electoral Assistance
The outcomes of electoral assistance and observation are 
said to have both positive and negative aspects.  “[E]lection 
monitoring, both domestic and international, can contribute 
to democratization but can also be counterproductive,” 
argued Bjornlund (2004, p. 14). 
Carothers (2004) praises election programs for: (1) 
helping draw attention to and publicize electoral fraud; (2) 
occasionally preventing fraud albeit it is hard to prove; (3) 
working closely with domestic groups to detect manipulations 
of voter registration, strategic ballot tempering and distortions 
in vote tabulation; (4) encouraging citizens to vote and the 
opposition to run for office; (5) improving the standards 
of election administration; and (6) training domestic poll 
watchers. 
Bjornlund (2004) emphasizes the following positives 
outcomes of electoral assistance: (1) improved public 
confidence in politically uncertain environments; (2) fairer 
election rules; (3) better campaign practices; (4) better 
informed public; (5) moral support to democratic activists; 
(6) increased transparency, which in turn deters fraud and 
helps reduce irregularities in the election administration.  
Among the negative aspects of electoral assistance 
Carothers (2004) mentions: (1) the ineffectiveness of outside 
monitors and observers in detecting fraud beyond the blatant 
ballot-stuffing; (2) the inevitable limitations of observing—
i.e., by definition, observers are not allowed to intervene; (3)
implementers cannot force political factions to cooperate; 
(4) implementers can’t guarantee that the international 
community will back up their findings of election fraud; (5) 
the proliferation of amateurish groups and unprofessional 
observers; (6) disproportionate attention to election day 
itself while fraud occurs before and after; (7) monitoring 
reports praise the authorities for order during the election 
and avoid criticizing biased media coverage or unequal 
resources; (8) reports focus on technical conditions rather 
than political problems (e.g., don’t recognize that sometimes 
elections legitimize the power of undemocratic leaders); 
(9) the standard of “free and fair” elections is a “sound 
bite;” (10) observation missions find it difficult to criticize 
governments (e.g., OSCE can’t criticize its member states); 
(11) some implementers are partisan; and (12) some donors 
and implementers underemphasize the role of domestic 
monitors.      
Bjornlund (2004) adds the following negatives 
outcomes: (1) “too much is expected of elections and election 
monitoring,” (p. 12); (2) “too much emphasis on election 
mechanics and election day itself” (p. 13); (3) observation 
missions are often superficial; (3) monitoring missions often 
have objectives other than democratization (e.g. national 
interests of sponsoring countries); and (4) international 
monitors attract more attention and funds than domestic. 
Bjornlund (2004) concluded: “A focus on form rather than 
substance and a failure to adhere to universal standards 
encourage Potemkin village democracies, as authoritarian 
governments pretend to hold real elections to please donors 
or others in the international community” (p. 14).    
The double-edged-sword effect of elections assistance 
in authoritarian states is also discussed in van Beuningen 
(2007) and Howard & Roessler (2006).  Van Beuningen 
stressed: 
Non-democratic governments might feel that pro-
democracy activities in their countries undermine 
their hold on power, and the fact that these activities 
are sponsored by external agents may provide 
them with sufficient argumentation for repressive 
measures, adducing threats to national sovereignty 
and stability (p. 55).  
Although in the recent years many authoritarian 
regimes hold regular, competitive elections between a 
government and an opposition, “the incumbent leader or 
party typically resorts to coercion, intimidation, and fraud 
to attempt to ensure electoral victory,” argue Howard & 
Roessler (2006, p. 365).  Nevertheless, Howard & Roessler 
found that such elections occasionally result in a liberalizing 
electoral outcome, which often leads to considerably less 
authoritarian new governments.  
On the other hand, Van Beuningen observed, pro-
democracy activists in those countries and their western 
sponsors sometimes do not “clearly separate their goal 
from more immediate and profane partisan objectives, thus 
providing substance to the autocrats’ claim of illegitimate 
political meddling” (2007, p. 55).  By western sponsors 
Van Beuningen meant not only donor organizations but also 
transnational NGOs implementing electoral assistance.  At 
times, their explicit or implicit partisanship undermines their 
good intentions of promoting democracy.   
NGOs’ Efforts to Address the Problems with 
Electoral Assistance
NGOs seem to understand that a democratic election alone 
does not change the political culture of a society overnight. 
Asia Foundation (2009), Carter Center (2009a) and IFES 
(2009a), for example, stress the importance of long-term 
efforts to build an inclusive democratic society, promote 
respect for human rights and laws, and encourage full citizen 
participation in government. 
While recognizing the shortcomings of their current 
elections work, NGOs are not ready to give up their electoral 
efforts.  For example, the Carter Center’s (2009a) elections 
program is rooted in a deep conviction that more governments 
than ever recognize democratic elections as essential to 
establishing their legitimate authority.  Soudriette (2008) 
of IFES believes that electoral assistance is necessary in 
particular in those countries where electoral chaos not only 
triggers internal conflicts and violates basic freedoms of their 
citizens but also threatens regional peace and stability.  
As the election observation component has been 
criticized the most, NGOs are joining efforts with multilateral 
and bilateral organizations to adopt a set of fundamental 
principles that would guide election observation.  At a 
meeting at the United Nations in October 2005, 22 inter-
governmental and nongovernmental organizations endorsed 
the Declaration of Principles for International Election 
Observation and pledged to further the goals of harmonization 
and cooperation in the field of election observation (United 
Nations, 2005).  Since its initial signing, an additional 10 
organizations have endorsed the Declaration.   
Echoing development and political science scholars, 
NGOs themselves engage in scholarly research to analyze 
and improve their electoral assistance.  For instance, a 
recipient of the William and Kathy Hybl Democracies 
Study Fellowship used the IFES’s funding to critically 
assess the current rating of countries based on a set 
of common democratic principles and develop an 
alternative, multivariable index that measures the quality 
of elections and countries’ democratic progress (IFES, 
2009d).  Similarly, the Carter Center (2009b) is working on 
developing a single set of criteria for assessing democratic 
elections based on public international law.
The Role of Transnational Civil Society
The sources reviewed in this paper not only confirm that 
elections is indeed an actual “global goods challenge” 
affecting both the developed and developing worlds, but 
also suggest that transnational civil society–and specifically, 
transnational NGOs–could play a greater role in tackling this 
challenge.
Electoral Assistance Community
As donor and recipient communities increasingly question 
the effectiveness of electoral assistance, some transnational 
NGOs join forces with bilateral and multilateral organizations 
in an attempt to disperse doubts (e.g., the above mentioned 
collaborations between IFES and UNDP).  NGOs and 
other concerned organizations advocate for a long-term 
commitment on the part of the implementers to address 
electoral assistance problems in a holistic manner that 
involves not only recipient governments but also the civil 
societies of recipient countries.  
Yet, evidence seems to show that most of the efforts to 
improve electoral assistance are carried out by a handful of 
U.S.-based transnational NGOs (e.g., Asia Foundation, Carter 
Center, IFES, IRI, and NDI).  Whether the quality of their 
electoral assistance is praised (Bjorlund, 2004; Carothers, 
2004, 2009; van Beuningen, 2007) or criticized as partisan 
and meddling (Carothers, 2004, 2009; Van Beuningen, 
2007), theirs are almost de rigueur names  in debates 
about elections and democracy promotion.  Most of these 
transnational NGOs are members or partners international 
networks and initiatives that bring together those concerned 
with the state of affairs in electoral assistance (e.g., the ACE 
Electoral Knowledge Network3 or the Global Initiative 
Enfranchise People with Disabilities4). 
It seems virtually impossible to identify the plethora 
of other NGOs frequently criticized as a whole for their 
failure to understand the importance of electoral assistance 
and lack of commitment towards supporting democracy in 
recipient countries.  Although scholars and development 
practitioners disapprove of those “shortsighted” types of 
NGOs, they usually abstain from naming names (Bjorlund, 
2004; Carothers, 2004).  
Thus, it appears that the community of electoral 
assistance NGOs is, in fact, not so large.  Its core NGOs, 
therefore, could begin addressing the problems with 
elections by reaching out to the lesser-known transnational 
NGOs and encouraging their participation in the electoral 
assistance initiatives such as, for example, the ACE 
Electoral Knowledge Network or the Global Initiative 
Enfranchise People with Disabilities.  Once included in the 
electoral assistance community, smaller NGOs would have 
an opportunity to understand the challenges this community 
faces and either improve the quality of their assistance or 
be deprived of donor funds. The inclusion of weak NGOs 
may precipitate their subsequent exclusion.  As simplistic 
as this method sounds, apparently it has worked in other 
development areas.
Tackling the Global Elections Challenge
The literature (e.g., Carothers, 2009; Chhotray & Hulme, 
2007; van Beuningen, 2007) and the analyzed NGO cases 
demonstrate that the global elections challenge consists 
of two components: (1) political—i.e., the problems with 
elections both in democratic and in authoritarian states; 
and (2) developmental –i.e., the problems with elections 
assistance.  The elections assistance NGO community, with 
or without its less-experienced actors, could play a role in 
addressing both.  
Some Political Solutions
Possible political solutions to the elections challenge include 
education and attitude change regarding the relationship 
between elections and democracy.  While elections do not 
equal democracy, they are indispensable for democracy—
that is, for all citizens to have access to power and enjoy 
rights and freedoms.  
Although the suspicions of cooptation by Western 
governments are almost inevitable, the transnational NGOs 
seeking to promote democratic ideals and support universal 
rights would have to expand their reach to those communities 
that feel disenchanted with election outcomes.  Unlike some 
governments and donor organizations, principled NGOs can 
under certain conditions “uphold international standards 
rather than advance bilateral policy interests” (Carothers, 
2004, p.95).  Moreover, in some situations, certain NGOs 
can take sides, show their support to local democrats, and 
avoid faking impartiality that is said to breed cynicism 
(Bjornlund, 2004). 
In other cases, influencial transnational NGOs would 
want to demonstrate their impartiality.  The latter, along with 
their host-nation counterparts, could concentrate on tailoring 
election education to the political and cultural environments 
of recipient countries.  Regardless of sources of funding, 
transnational NGOs should to engage the entire political 
spectrum--from undemocratic to democratic political parties 
and politically-active civil society groups.  By steering 
clear of partisanship, NGOs could establish credibility and, 
ultimately, enhance effectiveness of their programs.
Some Developmental Solutions
Possible developmental solutions involve changes and 
improvements both inside and outside of transnational 
NGOs.  Donors and NGOs involved in electoral assistance 
and elections observation would have to design more 
comprehensive programs in which elections are not the 
end but rather the means to a periodical reevaluation of 
effectiveness.  
Although some NGOs’ strengths are in electoral 
systems and processes only, their activities would have 
to be incorporated into the overall assistance process, 
focusing on equality and justice, governance, and capacity 
building.  The before- and after-election-day efforts would 
have to be stepped up, in particular work on election law, 
media coverage, campaign financing, and adjudication of 
complaints.  Moreover, the current initiative to link electoral 
assistance with elections observation (International IDEA, 
2009) would have to be pursued more aggressively to achieve 
continuity and avoid overlapping. 
In addition, transnational NGOs would have to 
improve their cooperation with national and local NGOs, 
media and political parties.  The empowerment of national 
and local civil societies to monitor election campaigns and 
their coverage would improve assessment of the pre- and 
post-election environments while deterring gross and subtle 
election fraud that is best detected with local monitors and 
observers. 
Some transnational NGOs could also take a more 
active position vis-à-vis elections fraud. On the one hand, 
they could plead the case of opposition parties and candidates 
before international organizations that have leverage with 
governments and could persuade or compel governments to 
recognize or correct fraud.  On the other hand, transnational 
NGOs—not obstructed by diplomatic protocol—could go 
beyond mere observation and focus on strategies to prevent 
fraud, shame authorities involved in or overlooking fraud, 
and publicize the cases of fraud or candidate persecution 
internationally.  
Finally, transnational NGOs could do a better job self-
regulating in the field of electoral assistance.  Adhering to 
a set of international standards would prevent NGOs from 
engaging in “electoral tourism” (Carothers, 2004) and raise 
prospects of providing meaningful assistance. 
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about/donorsandpartners.php#Government; the Carter Center, http://
www.cartercenter.org/homepage.html. 
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its partner NGOs can be found at http://aceproject.org/about-en/
organisations/partners/default. 
Information about the Global Initiative to Enfranchise 4. People with 
Disabilities is available at http://www.electionaccess.org/. 
